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Abstract 
This paper considers the implications of consumption and borrowing externalities in a small 
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1. Introduction
One measure of an economys Þnancial market integration is the terms at which it can borrow
in international capital markets. According to a basic deÞnition, a country may be perfectly
integrated if it can borrow (and lend) at the prevailing world interest rate, however the latter
is speciÞed. Due, however, to factors such as default risk, a developing economy may be subject
to an external constraint that regulates the terms at which it borrows from abroad. A way
of capturing this idea in a reduced-form framework is to specify that the interest rate on debt
depends on a countrys ability to service its existing level of international obligations. This leads
to an upward-sloping interest rate relationship in which the rate on debt rises with the level
of indebtedness, where the latter can be scaled by a measure, such as GDP, of the economys
ability to pay. An early use of this idea was employed by Bardhan (1967) and has, more recently,
been taken up by researchers such as Pitchford (1989), Bhandari et. al. (1990), Fisher (1995),
Age´nor (1998), Fisher and Terrell (2000), and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2004), all of whom
use the representative agent framework. These authors employ this relationship to study the
intertemporal impact of macroeconomic disturbances, such as domestic Þscal policy and world
interest rate shocks, on indebted open economies
In analyzing economies with this type of interest rate function, an important feature is
whether or not agents take into account the upward-sloping nature of the relationship; in
other words, whether or not agents recognize that their borrowing decisions aﬀect the equilibrium
interest rate on debt instruments. The models of Pitchford (1989), Bhandari et  al. (1990), and
Age´nor (1998) specify that agents do recognize the fact that greater foreign borrowing raises the
interest rate on debt, while the work of Fisher (1995), Fisher and Terrell (2000), and Chatterjee
and Turnovsky (2004) assumes, on the other hand, that agents take the interest rate on debt as
given in making their optimal choices. The latter formulation can be interpreted as a model of
sovereign debt, with the interest rate relationship incorporating a country speciÞc interest cost
function that is rising (and convex) in a measure of the economys indebtedness.1 Nevertheless,
as Pitchford (1989), among others, points out, the country speciÞc speciÞcation results in a
borrowing externality. While this externality is not (necessarily) crucial for the results of the
1Bhandari et. al. (1990) do, however, incorporate features of the sovereign debt model such shifts in the cost,
or risk, premium.
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work cited above, we show in our framework that it does play an important role in characterizing
the economys steady-state and saddlepath dynamics. Indeed, one of the goals of this paper is
to compare the dynamic properties of the two speciÞcations of borrowing behavior, which, in
certain respects, is more complex if these decisions are internalized.
A developing economy need not only be ridden with one externality, however. Indeed,
consumption and production externalities can also play a crucial role in inßuencing the evolution
of developing economies. In this paper we consider how consumption externalities aﬀect an
economy subject to an external borrowing constraint. Consumption externalities arise in our
framework because we assume that agents gain utility not only from their individual consumption
of goods and services, but also from their relative social position, or status. Using survey data
suggesting that higher levels of average income do not necessarily translate into higher levels
of personal satisfaction, Easterlin (1974, 1995) and Oswald (1997) infer, in contrast, that social
position is a key factor in determining overall well-being.2
In our reduced-form speciÞcation of instantaneous preferences, social status is conferred by
relative consumption, so that the consumption externality in our model corresponds to the de-
veloping economys average, or aggregate, level of consumption. There is a growing literature
that investigates the inßuence of consumption externalities in dynamic macroeconomies. Repre-
sentative authors who considered this issue in the closed economy context include Gal´õ (1994),
Rauscher (1997), Grossmann (1998), Fisher and Hof (2000a, b), Dupor and Liu (2003), and
Liu and Turnovsky (2004).3 We extend this work by analyzing consumption externalities in the
case of a two-good, open economy, subject to an external borrowing constraint. SpeciÞcally, we
assume that it is the relative consumption of imported goods that confers social position, an
idea that is, we believe, plausible in the case of a developing economy where foreign luxuries
represent status goods.
2More general studies of the economic implications of the quest for social status are provided by Frank (1985)
and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992). To curtail potentially wasteful status competition, Frank (1997)
advocates instituting a progressive consumption tax, implemented by exempting savings from taxation.
3An alternative branch of this line of research speciÞes that status depends on relative wealth, rather than
on relative consumption. Recent authors who have employed this approach include Corneo and Jeanne (1997),
Futagami and Shibata (1998), and Fisher (2004). Fisher (2004) shows how relative wealth preferences can be used
to obtainin the context of the small open economy Ramsey model with perfect capital mobilityan interior,
steady-state saddlepoint. General discussions of the problem of obtaining interior steady states in a small open
context are found in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), [ch. 3, pp. 101-25] and Turnovsky (1997), [ch. 2, pp. 36-47
and ch. 3, pp. 57-77]. One way of dealing with this issue is to impose an external borrowing constraint, an
approach we adopt in this paper.
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The basic framework we employ closely follows Fisher (1995): (i) the developing economy
is modelled as a representative consumer-producer who consumes a domestic goodproduced
using the single-factor laborand a good imported from abroad; (ii) the economy is semi-small
in the sense that it has an endogenous terms of trade (in goods) relative to the rest of the world;
and (iii) international borrowing is subject to an upward-sloping interest rate relationship that
depends on the stock of debt. We extend this framework, Þrst, by incorporating preferences that
are a function of the relative consumption of imported goods. Furthermore, in this paper we
modify the borrowing relationship by specifying that interest costs are a function of the debt
to GDP ratio. For convenience, we divide the exposition of the model into two parts: (i) the
decentralized framework that is subject to consumption externalities and in which agents take
the interest rate relationship as given; and (ii) the socially optimal framework, where the eﬀects
of the consumption externality are eliminated and in which the planner internalizes the interest
costs of the economys borrowing decision. To derive a symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium
in the decentralized framework, we assume that all agents take the same actions, which is the
typical procedure in models of this type. Moreover, because the interest rate relationship in this
paper depends on the debt to GDP ratio, there is also, in eﬀect, a production externality in the
decentralized equilibrium in addition to a borrowing externality.4
To investigate how the consumption externality interacts with the borrowing constraint, we
analyze how the economy responds over time to a permanent increase in the preference weight
on the relative consumption of imported goods. We show that this causes the economy in the
long-run to expand, i.e., due to higher work eﬀort domestic output increases, which, in turn,
results in a decline in the countrys terms of trade and a corresponding rise in net exports.5 As
a consequence, the economy supports a higher steady-state stock of debt and consumes more of
the imported good (the long-run response of steady-state consumption is, however, ambiguous).
Using a standard phase diagram apparatus, we illustrate the transitional dynamics in response
to the increase in status preference. While we distinguish three separate cases, we demonstrate
that the transitional adjustment of the economy in all instances involves current account deÞcits,
4Likewise, the model of Liu and Turnovsky (2004) incorporates consumption and production externalities,
although in their paper production externalities reßect spillovers from the aggregate capital stock.
5This result is consistent with the single-good, closed economy Þndings of Fisher and Hof (2000b) and Liu and
Turnovsky (2004), who show that preferences for relative consumption (or the existence of negative consumption
externalities) causes a rise in equilibrium employment relative to economies in which these motives are absent.
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a deterioration in the terms of trade, and declines in the economys consumption of domestic and
foreign goods. In addition, the trade balance, after an initial fall, improves along the economys
saddlepath in order to support the long-run increase indebtedness. In this part of the paper we
also describe the behavior of the interest rate on debt and the economys domestic, internal
rate of return, the latter depending on the dynamics of the terms of trade.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the modelling frame-
work and derives the circumstances in which the decentralized economy is characterized by
(local) saddlepoint dynamics. To study the interactions between borrowing and consumption
externalities, we consider in section 3 the intertemporal implications of a permanent increase
in the degree of status consciousness. Section 4 is devoted to analyzing the socially optimal
counterpart to the decentralized economy. In this section we analyze how the steady-state and
saddlepoint properties of the planners economy diﬀer from those of its decentralized counter-
part and calculate the optimal tax and subsidy policies that reproduce the social optimum.
The paper closes with brief concluding remarks in section 5 and an appendix containing some
mathematical results.
2. The Model and Intertemporal Equilibrium
We introduce the model by assuming that there are a large number of representative agents, each
of whom has the following instantaneous preferences over their own consumption of domestic
and foreign goods, x and y, status, s, and work eﬀort, l:6
W (x, y, s, l) ≡ U(x, y) + δs(y/Y ) + V (l), δ > 0. (2.1)
In this formulation, also employed by Rauscher (1997), Fisher and Hof (2000b), and Liu and
Turnovsky (2004), preferences over own consumption are additively separable from status. In
addition, both are separable from work eﬀort. According to (2.1), status depends on the relative
consumption of foreign goods, y/Y , where Y denotes the aggregate, or average, level of imported
goods consumed by the small open economy and the parameter δ represents the corresponding
6All variables in the model are denominated in real terms.
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utility weight.7 We further specify that W (x, y, s, l) has the following Þrst derivative and
curvature properties:8
Ux > 0, Uxx < 0, Uy > 0, Uyy < 0, Uxy > 0, UxxUyy − U2xy > 0,
s0 > 0, s00 < 0, Vl < 0, Vll < 0. (2.2)
The function U(x, y) obeys the standard assumptions that utility is increasing in the consump-
tion of own goods and strictly concave. The condition Uxy > 0 imposes Edgeworth comple-
mentarity on the own consumption of domestic and foreign goods. In addition, (2.2) implies
that status is increasing and concave in the relative consumption of imports, while work eﬀort
generates disutility and is strictly concave.
Regarding agents production and Þnancial market possibilities, we assume, Þrst, that the
production of tradable output, q, depends on the single factor employment, l, which has the
standard properties of positive and declining marginal productivity: q = F (l), F 0 > 0, F 00 <
0.9 We specify next that the interest rate at which agents borrow dependsin addition to
the exogenous and time invariant world interest rateon the economys ability to service its
outstanding level of obligations, as measured by the debt to GDP ratio. Letting rb[b/F (l)]
represent the interest rate on foreign debt, this relationship is deÞned by the following equation
rb ≡ rb[b/F (l)] = r∗ + α[b/F (l)], α0 > 0, α00 > 0, (2.3)
where r∗ is the given world interest rate and α[b/F (l)] is the country-speciÞc interest cost,
which is a positive, increasing function of b/F (l), the ratio of outstanding debt to domestic
output.10 Equation (2.3) is in contrast to most of the work cited above that speciÞes α(·) as
a function of b alone.11 The early study of Edwards (1984)showing a positive relationship
7Below, we employ a modiÞed version of δ, given by η ≡ δs0(1) > 0, where y ≡ Y in the symmetric equilibrium.
8The following notational conventions are observed: partial derivatives of functions are denoted by subscripts;
derivatives of functions with a single argument are indicated by primes; and time derivatives are denoted by
dots. In general, we suppress a variables time dependence.
9The implicit assumption of a Þxed domestic capital stock allows us to simplify the analysis, particularly
the derivation of the dynamic equilibrium, and to focus on some of the central implications of borrowing and
consumption externalities.
10We assume for expositional purposes that the country is always a net debtor, b > 0, although it is straight-
forward to generalize the results to the case in which the country is a net creditor, b < 0.
11Exceptions are Bhandari et. al. (1990) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2004), who scale national indebtedness
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between the interest rate spread over the LIBOR rate and the debt to GDP ratioprovides for
a set of developing economies some empirical evidence for (2.3). For our purposes, a further
crucial advantage of the debt to GDP speciÞcation in (2.3) is that shifts in status preference that
change the level of employment (and output) lead to a non-degenerate transitional dynamics,
which, on the other hand, do not occur if α(·) is a function of debt alone (see footnote 24 below).
In the context of a perfect foresight, dynamic equilibrium, the agents maximization problem
is formulated as follows
max
Z ∞
0
[U(x, y) + s (y/Y ) + V (l)]e−ρtdt, (2.4a)
subject to
úb = y + [x− F (l)]/p+ rb[b/F (l)]b, b(0) = b0 > 0, (2.4b)
where ρ is the exogenous rate of pure time preference, p is the relative price of the foreign in
terms of the domestic good, and b0 is the inherited stock of debt.
12 Observe that the ßow
constraint for the accumulation of debt is formulated in terms of the foreign good. In solving
the optimization problem, we posit that the agent takes the average consumption of imported
goods Y as given and ignores the eﬀect of his work eﬀort and borrowing decisions on the bond
rate rb.13 Applying standard optimizing techniques for this class of problem, the following Þrst
order conditions obtain
Ux (x, y) = λ/p, Uy (x, y) + Y
−1δs0 (y/Y ) = λ, (2.5a, b)
V 0(l) = −λF 0(l)/p, úλ = λ{ρ− rb[b/F (l)]}, (2.5c, d)
where λ the current costate variable, evaluated in terms of the foreign good. Equation (2.5a) is
the necessary condition for consumption of the domestic good, while (2.5b) is the corresponding
condition for imports. Observe that the marginal utility of imported goods is the sum of the
by the stock of physical capital.
12Since p is the relative price in terms of the domestic good, a rise (resp. fall) in p corresponds to a fall (resp.
decline) in the economys terms of trade.
13Since agents optimize holding rb constant, it is unnecessary to introduce the distinction between individual
and average levels of indebtedness. Also, as is usual in models of this type, the agent takes as given the terms of
trade p, although it is endogenous in equilibrium.
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direct marginal utility Uy (x, y) of imports and the marginal utility Y
−1δs0 (y/Y ) of status,
where the latter is scaled by Y −1δ. Equation (2.5c) is the optimality condition for employment,
while equation (2.5d) describes the evolution of the shadow value if international borrowing is
selected optimally, given that agents neglect the eﬀect of their choices of b and l on rb. We next
impose the following transversality condition that constrains the limiting dynamics of debt and
insures that (2.5a)(2.5d) are suﬃcient for optimality: limt→∞ λbe−ρt = 0.
The next step is to derive the intertemporal macroeconomic equilibrium. Following the
standard procedure for this type of problem, we assume that each identical individual acts in
the same way and normalize the population of agents to unity. This implies y = Y holds ∀t ≥ 0
and results in the following symmetric equilibrium
Ux (x, y) = λ/p, Uy (x, y) + δs
0 (1) y−1 ≡ Uy (x, y) + ηy−1 = λ, (2.6a, b)
V 0(l) = −λF 0(l)/p, F (l) = x+ Z(p), (2.6c, d)
úλ = λ{ρ− rb[b/F (l)]}, úb = y − Z(p)/p+ rb[b/F (l)]b, (2.6e, f)
where we substitute for η ≡ δs0(1) > 0 in the optimality condition (2.6b) for imported goods.
In our subsequent analysis, we treat η as the parameter measuring the degree, or intensity, of
agents status preference for the relative consumption of imports. Observe that equation (2.6d) is
the market clearing condition for domestic production where Z(p), Z 0 > 0, represents the exports
of the domestic good, which increase as the relative price of the domestic good falls. Equally, the
(ßow) accumulation equation for debt in (2.6f)corresponding to the negative of the current
account balanceis written in terms of Z(p), so that [y − Z(p)/p] is the trade deÞcit. Note
further that the system (2.6a)(2.6f) implicitly includes the transversality condition. Moreover,
since the terms of trade is an endogenous variable in the macroeconomic equilibrium, we can
deÞne, under real interest rate parity, a domestic, or internal, rate of return rd that equals
the sum of the bond rate rb[b/F (l)] and the rate of change of the terms of trade úp/p:
rd = rb[b/F (l)] + úp/p = r∗ + α[b/F (l)] + úp/p. (2.7)
The equations (2.6a)(2.6d) constitute an short-run system that is solved for (x, y, p, l) in
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terms of the marginal utility of wealth λ and the status parameter η
x = x(λ, η), xλ < 0, xη > 0; y = y(λ, η), yλ < 0, yη > 0, (2.8a, b)
p = p(λ, η), pλ > 0, pη < 0; l = l(λ, η), lλ > 0, lη > 0, (2.8c, d)
where we indicate in (2.8a)(2.8d) the signs of the partial derivatives of the solutions (x, y, p, l)
with respect to λ and η.14 The actual expressions for the partial derivatives are stated in
the appendix [see (6.1a)(6.1d) and (6.2a)(6.2d)] and are interpreted as follows: a rise in the
shadow value λ lowers the consumption of domestic and foreign goods, x and y, and as well as
the consumption of leisure. The resulting increase in employment, l, and domestic output, q,
lowers, in turn, the relative price of domestic goods, i.e., p rises. In contrast, an increase in the
status preference parameter η increases the demand for imported goods y. Due the assumption
of Edgeworth complementarity (Uxy > 0), the higher value of η leads to an increase in the
consumption of domestic goods and leisure, i.e., both x and l rise. This, in turn, raises the
countrys terms of trade so that p falls.
Turning the economys dynamics, we obtain the diﬀerential equations describing the evo-
lution of the marginal utility of wealth and stock of debt by substituting the instantaneous
solutions (2.8b)(2.8d), together with the expression (2.3) for rb, into (2.6e)(2.6f):
úλ = λ
½
ρ−
·
r∗ + α
µ
b
F [l(λ, η)]
¶¸¾
(2.9a)
úb = y (λ, η)− Z [p (λ, η)]
p (λ, η)
+
½
r∗ + α
·
b
F [l(λ, η)]
¸¾
b. (2.9b)
Letting úλ = úb = 0 in (2.9a, b), the corresponding steady-state equilibrium constitutes the
following set of relationships
Ux (x, y) = λ/p, Uy (x, y) + ηy
−1 = λ, (2.10a, b)
V 0(l) = −λF 0(l)/p, F (l) = x+ Z(p), (2.10c, d)
14Although it is not the focus of the analysis, the equilibrium (2.8a)(2.8d) also depends on the parameters of
the production and export functions.
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rb = rb[b/F (l)] = r∗ + α[b/F (l)] = rd = ρ, (2.10e)
Z (p)− py = p{r∗ + α[b/F (l)]}b, (2.10f)
where the symbol  indicates a long-run variable. Equations (2.10a)(2.10d) are the long-run
versions of (2.6a)(2.6d), while (2.10e) and (2.10f) state, respectively, that the long-run interest
rates rb and rd equal the exogenous rate of time preference ρ and that steady-state interest
servicein terms of the domestic goodequals the domestic trade balance (net exports).
Taking Þrst-order approximations of (2.9a, b) around the steady-state system (2.10a)(2.10f),
the following matrix diﬀerential equation is obtained
 úλ
úb
 =
 θ11 θ12
θ21 θ22
 λ− λ
b− b
 , (2.11a)
where
θ11 =
λα0bF 0lλ
F 2
> 0, θ12 = −
λα0
F
< 0,
θ21 =
"
pyλ − βpλ
p
− α
0b2F 0lλ
F 2
#
< 0, θ22 = ρ+
α0b
F
> 0, (2.11b)
and where we substitute for β = Z0 − Z(p)/p > 0 in the expression for θ21.15 The stability
properties of this system are determined by the signs of the trace and determinant of the Jacobian
matrix J of (2.11a).16 These are given, respectively, by
tr (J) = µ1 + µ2 = θ11 + θ22 = ρ+
α0b
F
"
1 +
λF 0lλ
F
#
> 0 (2.12a)
det (J) = µ1µ2 = θ11θ22 − θ12θ21 =
λα0
F
"
pyλ − βpλ
p
+
ρbF 0lλ
F
#
(2.12b)
where µ1, µ2 are the eigenvalues of J that satisfy the corresponding characteristic polynomial:
µ2 − [tr (J)]µ+ det (J) = 0. (2.12c)
15The assumption β > 0 implies that export demand is price elastic, i.e., (Z 0p/Z) > 1.
16The functions constituting the elements of J, θij , i,j = 1, 2 are evaluated in the steady-state equilibrium, e.g.,
F = F (l).
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A necessary condition for the long-run equilibrium of (2.11a) to possess a saddlepoint is det(J) =
µ1µ2 < 0. This requires that the term in square brackets in (2.12b) be negative, i.e.:
pyλ − βpλ
p
+
ρbF 0lλ
F
< 0. (2.13)
If (2.13) is negative, then the dynamics of (2.11a) is characterized by (local) saddlepoint stability,
with µ1 < 0, µ2 > 0, | µ1 |< µ2.17 Using standard methods, we then obtain the following
saddlepath solutions for consumption and national debt
λ = λ+
θ22 − µ1
θ21
(b− b0)eµ1t = λ+ θ12
θ11 − µ1 (
b− b0)eµ1t, (2.14a)
b = b− (b− b0)eµ1t, (2.14b)
where b(0) = b0 > 0.
18 Combining the solutions (2.14a, b), we obtain the stable saddlepath that
describes the co-movements of the marginal utility and debt:
(λ− λ) = −θ22 − µ1
θ21
(b− b) = −θ12
θ11 − µ1 (b−
b). (2.15)
The graph of this relationship has a positive slope, which implies that b and λ and evolve in the
same directions along the stable adjustment path, i.e., sgn (úb) = sgn ( úλ).
We next derive the phase diagram, illustrated by Figure 1, of the dynamic system (2.14a, b).
Using equations (2.9a, b), the úλ = 0 and úb = 0 loci are described by the following relationships:
r∗ + α
·
b
F [l(λ, η)]
¸
= ρ, (2.16a)
Z[p(λ, η)]
p(λ, η)
− y(λ, η) =
½
r∗ + α
·
b
F [l(λ, η)]
¸¾
b. (2.16b)
The slopes of (2.16a, b)evaluated in long-run equilibriumequal:
(dλ/db) |λ˙=0 = F/bF 0lλ > 0, (dλ/db) |b˙=0 = −θ22/θ21 > 0. (2.17a, b)
17Loosely speaking, the condition for saddlepoint stability in (2.13) implies that a change in the marginal utility
has a greater eﬀect on the trade balance than on the bond rate. Observe also that the existence of a saddlepoint
in the decentralized equilibrium does not (directly) depend on the interest-cost function α (·) or its slope, α0 (·).
18Because µ1 is an eigenvalue of J, (θ22 − µ1)/θ21 = θ12/(θ11 − µ1).
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It is straightforward to account for the positive slopes of the úλ = 0 and úb = 0 loci: along úλ = 0,
a rise in b increases the bond rate rb relative to the rate of time preference ρ, putting downward
pressure on the marginal utility ( úλ < 0). To maintain úλ = 0, a rise in λ is required in order
to encourage greater work eﬀort and output, which brings the ratio of debt to GDP back to its
original level and, thus, the bond rate equal to the rate of time preference. Thus, points to the
right of (resp. to the left of) the úλ = 0 locus lie on paths in which rb exceeds (resp. is less than)
ρ, with λ decreasing, úλ < 0, (resp. increasing, úλ > 0). In the case of the úb = 0 locus, a higher
value of b leads, through higher interest service, to a deterioration in the current account balance
(úb < 0). The latter is not oﬀset unless λ rises, which causes a corresponding improvement in the
trade balance and maintains úb = 0. As such, points to the right of (resp. to the left of) the úb = 0
locus lie on paths in which the current account balance is negative, úb < 0 (resp. positive, úb > 0).
Moreover, the stability properties of the dynamic system are reßected in the relative slopes of
the úλ = 0 and úb = 0 loci. In particular, the case in which the slope of the úλ = 0 locus exceeds
the slope of the úb = 0 locus is equivalent to the condition (2.13) for saddlepoint stability:19
(dλ/db) |λ˙=0 = F/bF 0lλ > −θ22/θ21 = (dλ/db) |b˙=0 ⇔
pyλ − βpλ
p
+
ρbF 0lλ
F
< 0.
This case is illustrated in Figure 1, where the arrows depict the directions of the phase lines and
where the intersection of the úλ = 0 and úb = 0 lociillustrated by point Acorresponds to the
steady-state values of λ and b.20 The alternative case (not depicted) in which the slope of the
úb = 0 locus is greater than that of the úλ = 0 locus, i.e., (dλ/db) |b˙=0 > (dλ/db) |λ˙=0, results in an
equilibrium that is an unstable node. Observe that Figure 1 also shows the positively sloped,
stable saddlepath, based on equation (2.15) and depicted by the line SS. In terms of observable
variables, what additional information can be garnered from the saddlepath SS? Consider the
case in which initial stock of debt is less than its steady-state value, b0 < b, so that the economy
starting from point B approaches the saddlepoint A from below, with úλ > 0, úb > 0. Since xλ < 0,
19This point illustrates an important distinction between the interest rate speciÞcation (2.3) and the speciÞcation
of rb that depends on the stock of debt alone. In the latter case, studied by Fisher (1995), the úλ = 0 locus is
a vertical line, (dλ/db) |λ˙=0 = ∞, implying that the equilibrium of the linearized system is a unique, interior
saddlepoint.
20For expositional purposes, we restrict ourselves in Figure 1 (and subsequently) to the case in which úλ = 0 and
úb = 0 describe straight lines, although the relationships (2.16a, b) are not, in general, linear. As such, while we
concentrate here on the properties of local saddlepoints, the possibility of multiple equilibria cannot be excluded.
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yλ < 0, and pλ > 0 in (2.8a)(2.8c), transitional adjustment along the rising saddlepath SS
also involves declining consumption of domestic and foreign goods, along with a real depreciation
in the terms of trade. Moreover, the trade balance in terms of the foreign good improves along
the path from points B to A, eventually eliminating the current account deÞcit.21
3. Dynamics of an Increase in Status Preference
In this section we describe the dynamic response of the small open economy to an unanticipated
permanent increase in the status preference parameter η. To calculate the steady-state eﬀects of
an increase in status preference, we employ the steady-state solutions, equations (2.10a)(2.10f),
derived in the previous section and diﬀerentiate with respect to η, where the expressions for the
long-run multipliers are given in the appendix [see equations (6.3a)(6.3f)]. The transitional
responses of the small open economy are then calculated using the stable saddlepath solutions
(2.14a, b) and illustrated with phase diagrams based on Figure 1.
3.1. Long-Run Responses
The signs of the long-run multipliers with respect to an increase in η are given by:
∂λ
∂η
> 0,
∂l
∂η
=
¡
F 0
¢−1 ∂q
∂η
> 0,
∂b
∂η
> 0,
∂p
∂η
> 0,
∂x
∂η
≷ 0, ∂y
∂η
> 0. (3.1)
The steady-state dynamics described by the expressions in (3.1) are explained as follows: a
permanent rise in η leads to an increase in the marginal utility of wealth λ, which, in turn,
leads to a steady-state rise in employment and output, l and q, a result, as indicated above,
comparable those derived by Fisher and Hof (2000b) and Liu and Turnovsky (2004) for single
good, the closed economy. With a higher resource base, the economy supports a greater stock
of long-run debt, b. Nevertheless, these adjustments do not lead to a change in the steady-
state debt to GDP ratio, since, according to the long-run Euler relationship (2.10e), b/F (l) is
independent (as are the interest rates rb and rd) of the status parameter η. In addition, the
increase in steady-state interest service, due to the rise in b, requires that net exports, whether
21This is straightforward to show by calculating the time derivative of Z[p(λ, η)]/p(λ, η)− y(λ, η).
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in terms of the foreign or of the domestic good, increase to maintain long-run current account
equilibrium. The improvement in the trade balance is, moreover, accompanied by a long-run
deterioration in the terms of trade, i.e., by a rise in p. Regarding the long-run consumption
of foreign goods, a permanent increase in the preference weight on the relative consumption of
imports causes y to rise. On the other hand, we can show that the restrictions placed on the
(diﬀerential of) the steady-state system (2.10a)(2.10f) are insuﬃcient to determine the sign of
the long-run change of the domestic good x.
3.2. Transitional Dynamics
Using the solution (2.14a), the initial change in the marginal utility in response to an increase
in status preference equals:
∂λ(0)
∂η
=
∂λ
∂η
+
θ22 − µ1
θ21
∂b
∂η
≷ 0. (3.2)
The response of the marginal utility in (3.2) is ambiguous: while the steady-state rise in λ tends
to increase the value of λ (0), transitional factors involving the adjustment of (b,λ) along the
saddlepath tend to lower λ (0). Nevertheless, we can identify, using the úλ = 0 and úb = 0 loci
depicted in Figure 1, three distinct cases. In all three cases, illustrated, respectively, in Figures
2ac, a permanent increase in η causes úλ = 0 to shift down: a higher value of η raises work eﬀort,
lowering the debt to output ratio and, thus, the bond rate relative to the rate of time discount.
Given the initial value of b, a fall in λ is then required to maintain úλ = 0.22 In contrast, the
vertical shift in the úb = 0 locus in response to a rise in η can be positive or negative.23 The
reason for this ambiguity is due to the fact that an increase in the degree of status preference
has two, oﬀsetting eﬀects on the current account balance. On the one hand, a rise in η lowers,
through higher consumption of the foreign good, net exports. This puts downward pressure on
the current account balance and causes úb = 0 to shift-up. On the other hand, a higher value
22From (2.16a), the vertical shift in the úλ = 0 locus equals dλ = − (lη/lλ) dη < 0.
23Using (2.16b), the vertical shift in the úb = 0 locus equals:
dλ = −
·
pyλ − βpλ
p
− α
0b2F 0lλ
F 2
¸−1½
pyη − βpη
p
− α
0b2F 0lη
F 2
¾
dη,
where the term in {·} incorporates the oﬀsetting trade balance and interest service eﬀects of a rise in η.
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of η encourages greater work eﬀort (and output), which, given b0, lowers the bond rate r
b and
interest service. The latter eﬀect tends to improve the current account balance, which, in turn,
leads úb = 0 to shift down.24
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the case in which the trade balance eﬀect dominates so that the
úb = 0 locus shifts up in response to a permanent increase in the status preference parameter
η. The distinction between the two phase diagrams is that in Figure 2a, the vertical decline in
the úλ = 0 locus exceeds that of the úb = 0 locus in absolute value, while the opposite is true
in Figure 2b. In Figure 2a this means that the new saddlepath, described by the line DE, lies
below its original position (not depicted), implying that λ (0) falls from point A to point D before
proceeding up DE. In contrast, the new saddlepath GH in Figure 2b lies above its initial position
so that λ (0) rises from point A to point G at t = 0. The cases illustrated by Figures 2a and
2b are further distinguished by the initial responses of domestic and foreign goods consumption
and the terms of trade: combined with the direct eﬀect of a higher value of η [see (2.8a)(2.8c)],
the fall in λ (0) in Figure 2aand also below in Figure 2cresults in a rise in x(0) and y(0)
and a fall in p(0). In contrast, the initial response of these variables is ambiguous in the case of
Figure 2b in which λ (0) rises. Nevertheless, the transitional adjustment to long-run equilibrium
in both Figures 2a and 2b along the saddlepaths DE and GH involves, as established in (2.15),
increasing values of the marginal utility and the stock of debt, i.e., úλ > 0, úb > 0 and, thus,
reductions in the levels of domestic and foreign consumption, úx < 0, úy < 0, and a depreciation
in the terms of trade, úp > 0. Figure 2c illustrates the case in which the úb = 0 locus shifts down
in response to a rise in η: in other words, the interest service eﬀect described above dominates
the trade balance eﬀect. Here, the jump in λ (0) from point A to point J is unambiguously
negative. Nevertheless, as in Figures 2a and 2b, the marginal utility and the stock of debt rise
toward their steady-state values, in this case along the new saddlepath JL.25
To further describe the response of the economy to a shift in status preference, we conclude
this section of the paper by considering the behavior of the trade balance, the bond rate rb,
24If rb is solely a function of b, then úλ = 0 does not shift in response to an increase in η. Moreover, since úb = 0
unambiguously shifts up in this case, the shadow value immediately rises to λ with no transitional dynamics.
Note, however, that for macroeconomic disturbances such as world interest rate shocks, the speciÞcation of rb as
a function of b alone suﬃces to generate an interior equilibrium with saddlepoint dynamics.
25The shift in úλ = 0 in Figure 2c must, however, suﬃciently exceed that of úb = 0 in order for the long-run
equilibrium at point L to correspond to higher values of λ and b.
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and the domestic rate of return rd.26 Linearizing the expression for the trade balance about the
steady-state equilibrium (2.10a)(2.10f) and substituting for (2.14a)(2.14b), its solution path
corresponds to:
TB = ρb− (pyλ − βpλ)(θ22 − µ1)
pθ21
(b− b0)eµ1t. (3.3)
Diﬀerentiating (3.3) with respect to η and evaluating at t = 0, the initial response of the trade
balance equals:
∂TB(0)
∂η
=
·
ρ− (pyλ − βpλ)(θ22 − µ1)
pθ21
¸
∂b
∂η
. (3.4a)
Using the deÞnition of θ21 and substituting for θ22 in (3.4a), we can demonstrate that the change
in the trade balance at t = 0 is given by:
∂TB(0)
∂η
= θ−121 [µ1p
−1(pyλ − βpλ)− (b/λ) det (J)] < 0. (3.4b)
Thus, a permanent increase in η causes the trade balance to deteriorate on impact, a result
true for all three cases described abovethat depends on the suﬃcient condition that the long-
run equilibrium is a saddlepoint, i.e., det (J) < 0. Using the solution path (3.3), it is clear,
nevertheless, that subsequent to t = 0 the trade balance improves continuously in order to
support the rising stock of debt. Regarding the interest rates rb and rd, we show in the appendix
that their solution paths correspond, respectively, to:
rb = ρ+
α0µ1
F (θ11 − µ1)(
b− b0)eµ1t, (3.5a)
rd = ρ+
α0µ1
F (θ11 − µ1)(1− pλ
λ/p)(b− b0)eµ1t. (3.5b)
Evaluating (3.5a, b) at t = 0 and combining, we show that both rates initially fall in response
to a permanent increase in η, i.e.:
∂rd(0)
∂η
= (1− pλλ/p)∂r
b(0)
∂η
< 0. (3.6)
The expression reveals two crucial aspects of the economys short-run adjustment. One is the
26The procedure used to obtain the solutions of these variables is found, in the appendix, equations (6.4a)
(6.4b), (6.5a)(6.5c), and (6.6a)(6.6b), respectively.
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fact that since rb declines on impact, it must case that the debt to GDP ratio falls at t = 0. Since
the stock of debt is given at t = 0, this means that employment and output initially increase in
response to the rise in η, a result that obtains whether or not λ(0) rises or falls. As a consequence,
interest service declines in the short-run, which implies that the initial current account deÞcits
are caused by the short-run deterioration (eventually reversed) in the trade balance. The other
aspect is that the domestic rate of return rd, while also below its long-run value of ρ, lies above
the bond rate at t = 0. This is due to the fact that terms of trade depreciates at t = 0, i.e.,
úp/p = pλ úλ(0)/p > 0, which, under interest rate parity, raises the domestic rate relative to the
bond rate.27 Finally, both interest rates rise for t > 0, converging to their common steady-
state value of ρ, reßecting both accumulation of debt, which increases the bond rate, and the
continued appreciation in the terms of trade, which raises the internal rate. The adjustment
paths of the two rates are illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts the initial declines in rb(0) and
rd(0) and their subsequent convergence to ρ.
4. The Planner’s Problem and Optimal Taxation
4.1. Intertemporal Equilibrium
In this section of the paper we derive the solution to the model from a social planners point
of view. The key distinction between the solution of the planners problem and that of the
representative agent is that the planner internalizes the consumption and borrowing external-
ities ignored by the representative agent. In terms of the consumption externality, the planner
assigns to each identical agent the same level of imported goods, y = Y . Likewise, the planner
sets the level of work eﬀort and the stock of debt to take into account the fact that these choices
aﬀect the interest rate rb at which the economy borrows from abroad. To distinguish the Pareto
optimal solution from its decentralized counterpart, we denote the variables of the optimal so-
lution with the superscript o.28 The social planners optimization problem is thus formulated
in the following way
max
Z ∞
0
[U(xo, yo) + δs (1) + V (lo)]e−ρtdt, (4.1a)
27We can show that the term (1− pλλ/p) in (3.5b), while less than unity, is positive.
28It is assumed in this section that functions are evaluated at their Pareto optimal values, e.g., F = F (lo).
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subject to
úbo = yo + [xo − F (lo)]/po + {r∗ + α[bo/F (lo)]}bo, bo(0) = bo0 > 0, (4.1b)
where, as before, ρ is the exogenous rate of time preference and po is the relative price of the
foreign in terms of the domestic good. We substitute expression for the bond rate rb[bo/F (lo)]
in (4.1b) to emphasize the fact the planner takes into account the eﬀect that work eﬀort and
borrowing decisions have on the bond rate. Solving this problem, the following socially optimal
equilibrium is derived
Ux (x
o, yo) = λo/po, Uy (x
o, yo) = λo, (4.2a, b)
V 0(lo) +
λoα0(bo)2F 0
F 2(lo)
= −λoF 0(lo)/po, F (lo) = xo + Z(po), (4.2c, d)
úλo = λo{ρ− rb[bo/F (lo)]− α0bo/F (lo)}, úbo = yo − Z(po)/po + rb[bo/F (lo)]bo, (4.2e, f)
where λo is the current Pareto optimal costate variable and where the market clearing condition
(4.2d) and current account relationship (4.2f) are added to complete the system. Examining
the optimality conditions in equations (4.2a)(4.2f), we see the crucial diﬀerences between the
Pareto and decentralized economies. In (4.2b), there is no externality from the consumption
of imports. Indeed, because the planner sets y = Y prior to the calculating the optimality
conditions, status considerations and, in particular, the parameter η, play no role in the social
optimum. In (4.2c) the planner incorporates into his evaluation of the disutility of work eﬀort the
fact that a greater level of employment lowers the interest cost of borrowing. Similarly, in (4.2e)
the planner takes into account that additional indebtedness raises the interest cost of borrowing.
In addition, the equilibrium (4.2a)(4.2f) implicitly incorporates, as in the decentralized case,
a transversality condition limt→∞ λoboe−ρt = 0 guaranteeing that the necessary conditions are
suﬃcient for an optimum.
An important implication of the optimality condition (4.2c) for work eﬀort is that the in-
stantaneous solutions in the planners equilibrium depend, in addition to the marginal utility λo,
on the stock of debt bo. In other words, equations (4.2a)(4.2d) constitute a short-run system
that is solved for as follows
xo = x(λo, bo), xoλ < 0, x
o
b > 0; y
o = y(λo, bo), yoλ < 0, y
o
b > 0, (4.3a, b)
17
po = p(λo, bo), poλ > 0 p
o
b > 0; l
o = l(λo, bo), loλ > 0, l
o
b > 0, (4.3c, d)
where the signs of the partial derivatives of (xo, yo, po, lo) with respect to the marginal utility of
wealth λo and the stock of debt bo are indicated in (4.3a)(4.3d).29 The partial derivatives with
respect to λo have an interpretation similar to that the decentralized model. In contrast, the
partial derivatives with respect to debt bo in the social equilibrium are explained as follows: a
higher stock of debt lowers the disutility of labor, since greater work eﬀort implies that a larger
stock of debt is less costly in terms of debt service. As such, employment rises, lob > 0, which
results in an expansion in domestic output that causes a fall in the terms of trade, pob > 0. The
latter implies, in turn, an increase in domestic consumption, xob > 0, and, because Uxy > 0, a
rise in foreign consumption, yob > 0.
Substituting the instantaneous solutions (4.3b)(4.3d) into (4.2e, f), we obtain the diﬀerential
equation system that describes the evolution of the marginal utility of wealth and stock of debt
úλo = λo
½
ρ−
·
r∗ + α
µ
bo
F [l(λo, bo)]
¶¸
− b
o
F [l(λo, bo)]
α0
µ
bo
F [l(λo, bo)]
¶¾
, (4.4a)
úbo = y (λo, bo)− Z [p (λ
o, bo)]
p (λo, bo)
+
½
r∗ + α
·
bo
F [l(λo, bo)]
¸¾
bo, (4.4b)
where we substitute in (4.4a, b) for the bond rate. Setting úλo = úbo = 0 in (4.4a, b), the
steady-state equilibrium of the social planner corresponds to
Ux(x
o, yo) = λo/po, Uy (x
o, yo) = λo, (4.5a, b)
V 0(lo) +
λoα0(bo)2F 0
F 2(lo)
= −λoF 0(lo)/po, F (lo) = xo + Z(po), (4.5c, d)
rb[bo/F (lo)] + α0bo/F (lo) = r∗ + α[bo/F (lo)] + α0bo/F (lo) = ρ, (4.5e)
Z (po)− poyo = po{r∗ + α[bo/F (lo)]}bo, (4.5f)
where, as before, the symbol  indicates a long-run variable. Similar to the decentralized frame-
work, equations (4.5a)(4.5d) are the long-run counterparts to (4.2a)(4.2d), while (4.5e) and
(4.5f) are, respectively, the steady-state Euler and current account relationships in the social
29The expressions for the partial derivatives of the socially optimal economy are stated in the appendix, equa-
tions (6.7a)(6.7d) and (6.8a)(6.8d).
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optimum. Moreover, comparing (4.5e) to (2.10e), it is straightforward to show that the long-run
debt to GDP ratio in the decentralized economy, b/F (l), is too high compared the optimal
ratio, bo/F (lo).30 This implies, in turn, that the steady-state bond rate in the decentralized
economy exceeds its socially optimal counterpart, i.e., rb > (ro)b. Since, as we show above,
b/F (l) is independent of the status preference parameter η, the deviations of b/F (l) and rb from
their social optima are due to the spillovers arising from the external borrowing constraint.
How do the other decentralized variables compare to those of the Pareto optimal equilibrium?
We consider this question by employing a technique, recently used by Liu and Turnovsky (2004),
that involves linearizing (2.10a)(2.10f) about (4.5a)(4.5f). The resulting system is then solved
for the steady-state diﬀerence between the decentralized and socially optimal values of the
economy [see equations (6.9) and (6.10a)(6.10e) in the appendix]. Moreover, this approach
also allows us to isolate the inßuence of the consumption externality from that the borrowing
externality. Consistent with our results in section 3, we can show that the decentralized values
of employment l (and output q), debt b, the consumption of imported goods y, and the marginal
utility λ exceed their socially optimal counterparts the larger is status preference parameter η.
In addition, the decentralized terms of trade are too low (i.e., p is too high) in the presence
of the relative consumption externality.
In contrast to these results, the borrowing externality has a more ambiguous inßuence on
the decentralized relative to the planning equilibrium. Two basic eﬀects can be identiÞed: (i)
in the Þrst, amounting to a relative price distortion, agents in the decentralized economy ignore
the eﬀects of work eﬀort on borrowing costs, which implies that employment (and output) are
not only too low relative to the social optimum, (l − lo) < 0, (q − qo) < 0, but also that
the terms of trade are too high, (p − po) > 0; (ii) in the second, the fact that the bond
rate in the decentralized equilibrium exceeds its socially optimal counterpart impliesdue to
the negative wealth eﬀect of a higher interest ratethat employment (and output) are too
high relative to the planners equilibrium, (l − lo) > 0, (q − qo) > 0 and that the terms of
trade are too low, (p − po) < 0. In fact, the only variable for which the two eﬀects work
in the same direction is the consumption of domestic goods, which we can showunder our
assumptionsis less than its socially optimal level, (x − xo) < 0. For all other decentralized
30Equating (4.5e) and (2.10e), we obtain α[b/F (l)]− α[bo/F (lo)] = a0bo/F (lo) > 0, which implies, since α(·) is
increasing, b/F (l) > bo/F (lo).
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variables, including the consumption of foreign goods, the stock of debt, and the marginal
utilityit is ambiguous whether they are higher or lower than their corresponding values in the
socially optimal economy.31
Taking Þrst-order approximations of (4.4a, b) around the steady state (45a)(4.5f), the
following matrix diﬀerential equation is obtained
 úλo
úbo
 =
 θo11 θo12
θo21 θ
o
22
 λo − λo
bo − bo
 , (4.6a)
where
θo11 =
λoF 0loλb
o
F 2
[2α0 + α00bo/F ] > 0, θo12 = −
λo(F − F 0lobbo)
F 2
[2α0 + α00bo/F ],
θo21 =
"
poyoλ − βopoλ
po
− α
0(bo)2F 0loλ
F 2
#
< 0, θo22 =
"
ρ+
α0bo[F − F 0lobbo]
F 2
+
poyob − βopob
po
#
,
(4.6b)
and where βo = Z0 − Z(po)/po is substituted into the element θo21. The signs of the trace and
determinant of the Jacobian matrix Jo of (4.6a) determine the local dynamics of the social
optimum. These relationships correspond to
tr(Jo) = µo1 + µ
o
2 = θ
o
11 + θ
o
22
= ρ+
λoF 0loλb
o
F 2
(2α0 + α00bo/F ) +
α0bo(F − F 0lobbo)
F 2
+
poyob − βopob
po
, (4.7a)
det(Jo) = µo1µ
o
2 = θ
o
11θ
o
22 − θo12θo21
=
λo
F 2
(2α0 + α00bo/F )
½
(F − F 0lobbo)
poyoλ − βopoλ
po
+ F 0loλb
o
·
ρ+
poyob − βopob
po
¸¾
, (4.7b)
where µo1, µ
o
2 are the eigenvalues of J
o such the following characteristic equation is satisÞed:
(µo)2 − [tr(Jo)]µo + det (Jo) = 0. For planners economy to possess a saddlepoint equilibrium,
det(Jo) = µo1µ
o
2 < 0. This obtains if the term in {·} brackets in (4.7b) is negative, i.e.:
det(Jo) = µo1µ
o
2 < 0 ⇔ (F − F 0lobbo)
poyoλ − βopoλ
po
+ F 0loλb
o
·
ρ+
poyob − βopob
po
¸
< 0.
31We can show, nevertheless, that the wealth eﬀect lowers y relative to yo and raises λ relative to λo.
20
If this condition is satisÞed, then the equilibrium of the planners problem, like its decentralized
counterpart, is a saddlepoint, with Jo possessing a negative and a positive eigenvalue: µo1 < 0,
µo2 > 0, | µo1 |< µo2.32 As in the decentralized framework, we can solve for the following stable
saddlepath that describes the transitional adjustment of (b,λ):
(λo − λo) = −θ
o
22 − µo1
θo21
(bo − bo) = −θ
o
12
θo11 − µo1
(bo − bo) = θ
o
12
θo11 − µo1
(bo − bo0)eµ
o
1t. (4.8)
Using equations (4.4a, b), the úλo = 0 and úbo = 0 loci in the socially optimal framework are
described by the following relationships:
r∗ + α
·
bo
F [l(λo, bo)]
¸
+
bo
F [l(λo, bo)]
α0
·
bo
F [l(λo, bo)]
¸
= ρ, (4.9a)
Z[p(λo, bo)]
p(λo, bo)
− y(λo, bo) =
½
r∗ + α
·
bo
F [l(λo, bo)]
¸¾
bo. (4.9b)
In contrast to the decentralized model, however, the úλo = 0 and úbo = 0 loci in the planning
framework are not unambiguously positive relationships. This is evident from the expressions
for their slopes, which correspond, respectively, to
(dλ/db)o |λ˙=0 = (F − F 0lobbo)/boF 0loλ, (dλ/db)o |b˙=0 = −θo22/θo21,
where the term (F − F 0lobbo) in the expression for (dλ/db)o |λ˙o=0 is ambiguous in sign, as is the
element θo22 in (dλ/db)
o |b˙o=0.33 Given the ambiguity of the slopes of the úλo = 0 and úbo = 0 loci,
there are six possible (local) cases, yielding six distinct (local) equilibria. Here, we brießy focus
on the three cases that yield saddlepoints (the equilibria in the other three cases correspond to
unstable nodes). The Þrst case we considerillustrated in Figure 4ais the one in which the
úλo = 0 locus is positively sloped, while the úbo = 0 locus, unlike in the decentralized framework,
is negatively sloped:
(dλ/db)o |λ˙o=0 > 0 > (dλ/db)o |b˙o=0.
32In contrast to the decentralized model, the stability properties of the planners equilibrium depend, through
the partial derivatives (yob , p
o
b , l
o
b) directly on the slope and curvature properties of α(·).
33The term (F − F 0lobbo) in (dλ/db)o |λ˙o=0 can be rewritten as (F − F 0lobbo) = (1 − ωoqlωolb)F , where ωoql =
(∂F/∂l)(l/F ) and ωolb = (∂l/∂b)(b/l) are, respectively, the elasticities of output with respect to employment and
employment with respect to debt. Thus, if ωoqlω
o
lb exceeds unity, then úλ
o = 0 is negatively sloped.
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What is the intuition behind a negatively-sloped úbo = 0 locus? Recall that in the social optimum
[see (4.3d)] an increase in bo encourages work eﬀort. This lowers, in turn, the debt to GDP
ratio and the bond rate, which tends to improve the current account (úbo < 0). Moreover, in this
context, a higher level of bo has relative price and trade balance eﬀects that also lead to úbo < 0. If
together these eﬀects are suﬃciently strong, they then dominate the direct negative implications
for the current account balance that a higher value of bo has on interest service, thus requiring
a fall in λo to maintain úbo = 0, as is depicted in Figure 4a. As in the decentralized framework,
saddlepathVV leading (bo,λo) to the equilibriumQ in Figure 4a is positive relationship, although
its slope, in general, diﬀers from SS in Figure 1.
The second casedepicted in Figure 4billustrates the situation in which both the úλo = 0
and úbo = 0 loci are negatively sloped, with úλo = 0 steeper in absolute value:
(dλ/db)o |λ˙o=0 < (dλ/db)o |b˙o=0 < 0.
How do we account for a negatively sloped úλo = 0 locus, which is the case as long as (F −
F 0lobb
o) < 0? As indicated, a rise in bo leads to greater employment and, thus, to a fall in
rb[bo/F (lo)]. From the Euler equation (4.2e), this leads to úλo > 0 unless the level of λo also
declines, the latter causing a rise in leisure that keeps úλo = 0. An important implication of
this case is thatin contrast to our previous examplesthe stable saddlepathWW is negatively
sloped, implying that the stock of debt and its shadow value move in opposite directions in the
transition to steady-state equilibrium, i.e., sgn (úbo) = −sgn ( úλo). What are the implications
of the negatively sloped WW locus? Consider the situation in which the initial stock of debt,
as in the decentralized economy in Figure 1, is less than its long-run value, bo0 <
bo. The
planner then chooses a declining path along WW starting at point R, with úλo < 0, úbo > 0.
From (4.3a, b), it is clear that adjustment toward point Q involves risinginstead of falling
domestic and foreign consumption: úxo = xoλ
úλo + xob
úbo > 0, úyo = yoλ
úλo + yob
úbo > 0. Nevertheless,
to close the current account deÞcit (úb > 0) between points R and Q, we can show that there
must be a corresponding surplus on the trade balance, reßecting in the social optimum the
direct positive eﬀects of growing levels of debt on the relative price and output.34 Finally,
the third saddlepoint case in the planners economy is qualitatively identical to that of the
34The solution path of the trade balance in the social optimum is derived in appendix, equations (6.11a)(6.11b)
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decentralized economy, i.e., both úλo = 0 and úbo = 0 are positively sloped, with úλo = 0 steeper
than úbo = 0: (dλ/db)o|λ˙o=0 > (dλ/db)o |b˙o=0 > 0. The corresponding phase diagram in this
instance is qualitatively the same as Figure 1 and is not reproduced here.
4.2. Optimal Policy
In this section of the paper, we derive the optimal policy to oﬀset the relative consumption, work
eﬀort, and borrowing externalities characterizing the decentralized economy. Given the fact that
there are three distinct externalities, three separate policy tools are required to attain the social
optimum. We assume that the policy tools available to public sector include a tariﬀ on levied
on the imported good, τy, a tax on domestic labor, τl, (amounting to a tax on output in this
single-factor framework), and surcharges, or penalties, τb, on international interest service.
The decentralized individual budget constraint (2.4b) then becomes
úb = (1 + τy)y +
x− (1− τl)F (l)
p
+ (1 + τb) r
b[b/F (l)]b+ T, (4.10)
where the government budget is closed by a continuous adjustment in lump-sum transfers (or
taxes), T : τyy + τlF (l) /p + τbr
b[b/F (l)]b = T . Solving the decentralized problem of section 2
under these constraints, it is straightforward to show that the necessary optimality conditions
in the symmetric equilibrium become:35
Ux(x, y) = λ/p, Uy (x, y) + ηy
−1 = (1 + τy)λ, (4.11a, b)
V 0(l) = −λ (1− τl)F
0(l)
p
, úλ = λ{ρ− (1 + τb) rb[b/F (l)]}. (4.11c, d)
The decentralized economy reproduces the planners optimum if the solutions for decentralized
case coincide with their Pareto optimal counterparts, i.e.: x = xo, y = yo, λ = λo, l = lo, p = po,
and b = bo. The latter obtains if the decentralized optimality conditions for imports, work eﬀort,
and borrowing, represented by (4.11b)(4.11d), equal their socially optimal counterparts (4.2b,
35In all other respects, the properties of the decentralized framework remain the same as in section 2. In addition
to imposing a transversality condition insuring suﬃciency, we assume that the introduction of distortionary
taxation does not aﬀect the saddlepoint property of the decentralized equilibrium, i.e., a condition analogous to
(2.13) obtains in this context.
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c, e):
Uy (x, y) + ηy
−1 = (1 + τy)Uy (x, y) , (4.12a)
V 0(l) +
(1− τl)λF 0(l)
p
= V 0(l) +
λα0b2F 0
F 2(l)
+
λF 0(l)
p
, (4.12b)
(1 + τb) [r
∗ + α[b/F (l)]] = r∗ + α[b/F (l)] + α0b/F (l). (4.12c)
Solving (4.12a)(4.12c) in terms of the relevant policy instrument, we obtain following optimal
tariﬀ, output tax, and interest surcharge (τ∗y , τ∗l , τ
∗
b ):
τ∗y =
η
Uy (x, y) y
> 0, τ∗l = −
pα0b2
F 2(l)
< 0, τ∗b =
α0b
F (l)rb[b/F (l)]
> 0.
Thus, the optimal policy to oﬀset the eﬀects of relative consumption and borrowing externalities
is to levy a positive tariﬀ on imports, a subsidyrather than a taxon employment (output),
and a positive charge, or penalty, on international interest payments. In other words, the
over-consumption of imported goods should be deterred by an appropriate tariﬀ, work eﬀort
should be subsidized to achieve the optimal debt to GDP ratio given the upward-sloping interest
rate relationship, and, similarly, international borrowing should be penalized to internalize the
interest cost externality of greater indebtedness.36
5. Conclusions
This paper employs a standard developing economy framework to consider the interactions of
macroeconomic spillovers. The particular externalities we consider are consumption externali-
ties and spillovers arising from an external borrowing constraint. The consumption externality
reßects the assumption that agents social status depends on their relative consumption of im-
ported goods, while the upward-sloping interest rate relationship leads agents to neglect the
eﬀects of their borrowing decisions on the interest cost of their international obligations. A key
feature of the external borrowing constraint is that interest costs are a positive function of the
debt to GDP ratio. This speciÞcation has important implications for the economys saddlepoint
36Observe, for example, that τ∗y rises with the degree of status preference η and that τ
∗
l increases (in absolute
value) the lower is the terms of trade p. Finally, note that τ∗b coincides with the partial elasticity of the bond rate
rb with respect to the stock of debt b.
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dynamics and results in a production externality as well as a direct borrowing externality.
The goal of this paper is to analyze an economy characterized by these phenomena and contrast
its behavior with that of the social planners.
To brießy highlight some of the chief results of the paper, we analyzed the response of the
open economy in the decentralized equilibrium to a permanent rise in the preference weight
that agents place on status considerations. We show that this leads to a long-run rise in employ-
ment and outputconsistent with closed economy studies of this issueand to current account
deÞcits, declines in the consumption of domestic and foreign goods, and a depreciation in the
terms of trade during the transition to the steady-state equilibrium. We also Þnd that the bond
rate and the domestic interest rate decline on impact and then increase toward their common
steady-state value, the exogenous time rate of preference. Due to the depreciation in the terms
of trade, the domestic rate lies above the bond rate during the transition.
In the second half of the paper, we study the contrasting steady-state and dynamic properties
of the social planners equilibrium. Focusing on the implications of the borrowing externality,
we show that the steady-state debt to GDP ratio and bond rate are too high and the long-run
consumption of domestic goods is too low in the decentralized equilibrium relative to the social
optimum. Regarding the other variables, it is ambiguous whether their long-run values are higher
or lower than their socially optimal counterparts, due to the oﬀsetting eﬀects of the resulting
relative price and wealth distortions. We also derive the intertemporal properties of the planners
economy and show that saddlepath for debt and the marginal utility of wealth can be negatively
sloped, which is in contrast to the upward-sloping saddlepath in the decentralized case. Finally,
we demonstrate that the optimal policy combination to achieve the Pareto optimum involves a
tariﬀ on imports, a subsidy on employment, and a penalty on international borrowing.
6. Appendix
6.1. Partial Derivatives in (2.8a)—(2.8d)
Diﬀerentiating the instantaneous decentralized equilibrium (2.6a)(2.6d) with respect to λ, we
calculate the following partial derivatives.
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(i) For λ:
xλ = −D−1
©£¡
Uyy − ηy−2
¢
/p− Uxy
¤
ΛZ 0 + Uxyλ(F 0)2/p2
ª
< 0, (6.1a)
yλ = −D−1
©£
(Uxx − Uxy/p)Z0 − λ/p2
¤
Λ−Uxxλ(F 0)2/p2
ª
< 0, (6.1b)
pλ = D
−1{£Uxx(Uyy − ηy−2)− U2xy¤ ¡F 0¢2 /p+ £(Uyy − ηy−2)/p− Uxy¤Λ} > 0, (6.1c)
lλ =
¡
F 0/pD
¢ ©£
Uxx
¡
Uyy − ηy−2
¢− U2xy¤Z0 −Uxyλ/pª > 0. (6.1d)
(ii) For η:
xη = Uxy/yD
©
λ(F 0)2/p2 −ΛZ0ª > 0, (6.2a)
yη = −(yD)−1
©
Uxx
£
λ(F 0)2/p2 − ΛZ0¤+ Λλ/p2ª > 0, (6.2b)
pη = (yD)
−1UxyΛ < 0, lη = UxyλF 0/p2yD > 0, (6.2c, d)
where D = [Uxx(Uyy − ηy−2) − U2xy][λ (F 0)2 /p2 − ΛZ 0] + (Uyy − ηy−2)Λλ/p2 > 0 and Λ =
(V 00 + λF 00/p) < 0. To guarantee that leisure is a normal good, we impose [Uxx(Uyy − ηy−2)−
U2xy]Z
0 − Uxyλ/p > 0 in (6.1d).
6.2. Expressions for the Long-Run Comparative Statics
Diﬀerentiating the steady-system (2.10a)(2.10f) with respect to η, we derive the following long-
run comparative statics expressions discussed in section 3.
∂b
∂η
=
−α0b(F 0)2
yF 2∆
[βUxy/p− Z0Uxx] > 0, (6.3a)
∂l
∂η
=
¡
F 0
¢−1 ∂q
∂η
=
−α0F 0
yF∆
[βUxy/p−Z 0Uxx] > 0, (6.3b)
∂λ
∂η
=
−α0
yF∆
n
Uxxp[Z
0Λ− λ ¡F 0¢2 /p2]− Λ(Uxyβ + λ/p) + ρUxyλb ¡F 0¢2 /(F p)o > 0, (6.3c)
∂p
∂η
=
−α0
yF∆
[(F 0)2(ρUxyb/F − Uxx)− Λ] > 0, (6.3d)
∂x
∂η
=
−α0
yF∆
[−Uxy
¡
F 0
¢2
(ρbZ0/F − β/p) + Z 0Λ] ≷ 0, (6.3e)
∂y
∂η
=
−α0
yF∆
[Uxx(F
0)2(ρbZ0/F − β/p)− βΛ/p] > 0, (6.3f)
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where
∆ =
α0
F
n
Uxxλ
¡
F 0
¢2
/p+ Λ[λ/p− Z0(Uxxp−Uxy)] + βΛ[Uxy − 1/p(Uyy − ηy−2)]
o
−α0(F 0)2/F [ρbUxyλ/pF − Γ(ρbZ0/F − β/p)] < 0,
letting Λ = (V 00 + λF 00/p) < 0 and Γ = [Uxx(Uyy − ηy−2) − U2xy] > 0. To insure ∆ < 0, we
impose the suﬃcient condition (ρbZ 0/F − β/p) < 0, which also guarantees ∂y/∂η > 0 in (6.3f).
6.3. Expression for the Trade Balance
Linearizing the expression for the trade balance in terms of the foreign good, given by TB =
Z[p(λ, η)]/p(λ, η)− y(λ, η), we obtain:
TB = Z(p)/p− y − p−1(pyλ − βpλ)(λ− λ). (6.4a)
Substituting for (2.14a) and using the fact that Z(p)/p− y = ρb, we derive the solution path for
the trade balance:
TB = ρb− (pyλ − βpλ)(θ22 − µ1)
pθ21
(b− b0)eµ1t. (6.4b)
6.4. Expressions for rb and rd
(i) For rb:
Linearizing (2.3) and substituting the expressions (2.14a)(2.14b), we obtain the following
solution path for the bond rate rb:
rb = ρ− α
0
Fθ21
[θ21 +bF
−1F 0lλ (θ22 − µ1)](b− b0)eµ1t. (6.5a)
To simplify (6.5a), we substitute for (θ22 − µ1) = θ12θ21/ (θ11 − µ1), using the characteristic
equation (2.12c):
rb = ρ− α
0
F (θ11 − µ1) [(θ11 − µ1) +
bF−1F 0lλθ12](b− b0)eµ1t. (6.5b)
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This expression can be further reduced by substituting into (6.5b) the elements θ11, θ12 from
the Jacobian matrix J of (2.11a). This yields
rb = ρ+
α0µ1
F (θ11 − µ1)(
b− b0)eµ1t, (6.5c)
and is the basis of our discussion regarding the adjustment of rb in section 2.
(ii) For rd:
From the deÞnition (2.7), substituting for (6.5c) and for úλ using (2.14a), the expression for
the domestic rate of return rd corresponds to:
rd = rb + pλ úλ/p = ρ+ µ1
·
α0
F (θ11 − µ1) +
pλ (θ22 − µ1)
pθ21
¸
(b− b0)eµ1t. (6.6a)
Using the fact that (θ22 − µ1)/θ21 = θ12/(θ11 − µ1) and substituting for θ12, we can show that
(6.6a) simpliÞes to:
rd = ρ+
α0µ1(1− pλλ/p)
F (θ11 − µ1) (
b− b0)eµ1t. (6.6b)
We can show that the (1− pλλ/p) term in (6.6b) equals −(V 00+λF 00/p)lλ/F 0, which positive as
long as leisure is a normal good, i.e., lλ > 0.
6.5. Partial Derivatives of (4.3a)—(4.3d)
Diﬀerentiating the instantaneous Pareto-optimal equilibrium (4.2a)(4.2d) with respect to λo
and bo, we calculate the following partial derivatives.
(i) For λo:
xoλ = −(Do)−1{(Uyy/p− Uxy)(Λo + γ)Z0 + λF 0/(po)2(UxyF 0 + Uyy²)} < 0, (6.7a)
yoλ = −(Do)−1{[(Uxx−Uxy/po)Z0−λo/(po)2](Λo+ γ)−λoF 0/(po)2(UxxF 0−Uxy²)} < 0, (6.7b)
poλ = (D
o)−1{(UxxUyy − U2xy)F 0
¡
F 0/po + ²
¢
+ (Uyy/p
o − Uxy)(Λo + γ)} > 0, (6.7c)
loλ = (D
o)−1{(UxxUyy − U2xy)Z0
¡
F 0/po + ²
¢− λo/(po)2(UxyF 0 + Uyy²)} > 0. (6.7d)
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(ii) For bo:
xob = −φF 0Uyyλo/(po)2Do > 0, yob = φF 0Uxyλo/(po)2Do > 0, (6.8a, b)
pob = φF
0(UxxUyy−U2xy)/Do > 0, lob = φ[(UxxUyy−U2xy)Z0−Uyyλo/(po)2]/Do > 0, (6.8c, d)
where Do = (UxxUyy − U2xy)[λo (F 0)2 /(po)2 − (Λo + γ)Z0] + (Λo + γ)Uyyλo/(po)2 > 0. Note
that we have made the following substitutions into (6.7)(6.8): γ = −λo(bo)2F−4{α00bo(F 0)2 −
α0[F 00F 2 − 2(F 0)2]} < 0, φ = λF−2F 0bo(2α0 + α00bo/F ) > 0, and ² = α0(bo)2F 0/F 2 > 0, with
Λo = (V 00 + λoF 00/po) < 0. In (6.7a) and (6.7d) we assume that suﬃcient conditions for xoλ < 0,
loλ > 0 obtain.
6.6. Expressions for the Deviations of Decentralized Variables from Their Social
Optima
Linearizing the decentralized steady-state (2.10a)(2.10f) about its socially optimal counterpart
(4.5a)(4.5f), we derive the following system in the deviations of (x, y, p, l, λ) from (xo, yo, po,lo, λo)

Uxx Uxy λ
o/(po)2 0 −(po)−1
Uxy Uyy − η(yo)−2 0 0 −1
0 0 −λoF 0/(po)2 V 00 + λoF 00/po F 0/po
−1 0 −Z 0 F 0 0
0 −po β poρF 0bo/F 0


x− xo
y − yo
p− po
l − lo
λ− λo

=

0
−η/yo
λoα0(bo)2F 0/F 2
0
−Ωbo

(6.9)
where we substitute for (b−bo) = [F +F 0(l−lo)]bo/F to obtain a Þve-equation system. Clearly,
(6.9) distinguishes between the eﬀects of the relative consumption externality [embodied in
the second element of the vector on the right-hand-side of (6.9)] and the borrowing externality
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[embodied in the third and Þfth elements of the vector on the right-hand-side of (6.9)]. They can,
thus, be considered separately. While it is straightforward to solve for the deviations in terms of
the relative consumption externality, we do not state the solutions here, since the corresponding
expressions diﬀer from the steady-state comparative statics given in (6.3a)(6.3f) only because
the former are multiplied by the status parameter η. Solving then for the deviations in terms
of the borrowing externality, we calculate the expressions that are the basis of our discussion in
section 4
l−lo = F
0bo
∆0
(
λoα0bo
F 2
[λo/po − Z0(Uxxpo − Uxy) + β(Uxy − Uyy/po)] +
Ωo
po
(ΓoZ 0 − Uxyλo/po)
)
≷ 0,
(6.10a)
p− po = −
bo
∆0
(
λoα0bo(F 0)2
F 2
"
(poUxx − Uxy) + p
oρbo
F
(Uyy/p
o − Uxy)
#
+Ωo[Λo(Uyy/p
o − Uxy) + Γo(F 0)2/po
o
≷ 0, (6.10b)
λ− λo =
bo
∆0
(
λoα0bo(F 0)2
F 2
h
(Γoβ −Uxyλo/po)
i
− p
oρbo
F
[ΓoZ 0 − Uyyλo/(po)2]
−Ωo[Λo[ΓoZ0 − Uyyλo/po]− λo(F 0)2Γo/(po)2
o
≷ 0, (6.10c)
x− xo =
bo
∆0
(
λoα0bo(F 0)2
F 2
h
(Uyy − poUxy)(ρboZ 0/F − β/po) + λo/(po)2
i
−Ωo[Z 0Λo(Uyy/po − Uxy) + UxyλoF 0/(po)2]
o
< 0, (6.10d)
y − yo = −
bo
∆0
(
λoα0bo(F 0)2
F 2
h
(Uxy/p
o − Uxx)(ρboZ0/F − β/po) + λoρbo/(F po)
i
−Ωo
h
Λo[λo/(po)2 − Z 0(Uxx − Uxy/po)] + Uxxλo(F 0)2/(po)2
io
≷ 0, (6.10e)
where
∆0 = Uxxλo
¡
F 0
¢2
/po + Λo
h
λo/po − Z 0(Uxxpo − Uxy) + β(Uxy − Uyy/po)
i
−(F 0)2
h
ρboUxyλ
o/(poF )− Γo(ρboZ0/F − β/po)
i
< 0,
and letting Λo = (V 00+λoF 00/po) < 0, Γo = (UxxUyy−U2xy) > 0, and Ωo = −po(ρ+α0bo/F ) < 0.
To guarantee ∆0 < 0 and (x− xo) < 0, we impose the suﬃcient condition (ρboZ 0/F −β/po) < 0
used above in (6.3a)(6.3f). Observe that we set η ≡ 0 in (6.10a)(6.10e).
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6.7. Solution for the Trade Balance in the Social Optimum
Using (4.3b, c) the trade balance in terms of the foreign good in the social optimum is given
by TBo = Z[p(λo, bo)]/p(λo, bo)− y(λo, bo). Linearizing this expression and substituting for the
solution path (4.8), we obtain:
TBo = ρbo −
½
(pyoλ − βpoλ)(θo22 − µo1)
poθo21
− (pyb − β
opob)θ21
po
¾
(bo − bo0)eµ
o
1t. (6.11a)
Using the fact that (θo22 − µo1)/θo21 = θo12/θo11 − µo1 and substituting for θo11 and θo12 from (4.6b),
we can show that (6.11a) reduces to:
TBo = ρbo+(θo11−µo1)−1{detJo−(λo/F 2)(2α0+α00bo/F )F 0loλboρ−µ1(pyob−βopob)/po}(bo−bo0)eµ
o
1t.
(6.11b)
Since for (local) saddlepoint equilibria detJo < 0, a suﬃcient condition for the term in {·}
brackets to be positive is [pyob−βopob]/po < 0, which holds as long as (UxxUyy−U2xy)−Uxyλ/p2 > 0.
Diﬀerentiating (6.11a) with respect to time, it is clear that the trade balance improves along a
saddlepath in which bo0 <
bo.
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Figure 1: Phase Diagram
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